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Mullen: Civil Procedure

CIVIL PROCEDURE

SUMMARY

TOWNSEND v. HOLMAN CONSULTING
CORP.: RULE 11 SANCTIONS, IGNORANCE

OR VIGOROUS LITIGATION IS NO EXCUSE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a unanimous en banc ruling, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp.,I held that
an attorney may be sanctioned under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 2 for a partially frivolous 3 pleading. The
1. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990)(en
banc)(per Fletcher, C. J.; the other panel members were Wallace, J., Tang, J., F. Poole,
J., Nelson, J., Noonan, J., Q'Scannlain, J., Trott, J., concurring, Canby, J., and Pregerson, J.).
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 deals with disciplinary sanctions to check abuses in signing of
pleadings. The rule provides in part,
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by the
signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other
paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation . . . . If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court . . .
shall impose . . . an, appropriate sanction.
The provisions apply to motions and other papers by incorporation of FED. R. CIV. P. 7
(b)(2) and 7(b)(3). Sanctions may be imposed on the attorney, the party the attorney
represents or both.

39
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court rejected the argument that the pleadings could not be the
subject of sanctions because they also included non-frivolous requests for relief.· Prior Ninth Circuit decisions had permitted
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions only when the pleading as a
whole was frivolous. Ii
This decision expands attorney liability under Rule 11 and
vacates an earlier panel decision of the Ninth Circuit,S which
had reversed the district court's orders imposing sanctions. 7

II.

FACTS

After an unsuccessful state court action, Patrick Townsend,
an employee of a contracting company, sued in federal court for
the payment of medical benefits under an Employer Benefit
Plan (Plan).8 The complaint named the law firm of Wilson &
Reitman (Wilson), which had represented the Plan in the state
court action as one of the defendants. 9 Wright, the attorney for
the Townsends,I° alleged that Wilson had "advised the Plan to
adopt certain provisions challenged in the suit, counseled the
Plans' administrators not to make payments to Townsend and
3. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1137. Frivolous is a term used by the Ninth Circuit "to
denote a filing that is baseless and made without a reasonable inquiry." Id. at 1140.
4. Id. at 1138-39.
5. See Murphy v. Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Rule 11 sanctions inappropriate of pleading as a whole is not frivolous or harassing).
The holding in Murphy interpreted a passage in Golden Eagle Dist. Corp. v. Burroughs
Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1986) (Rule 11 sanctions inappropriate where
only a portion of an otherwise meritorious pleading is frivolous) to include not just legal
arguments but also allegations. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1141. In Golden Eagle, the court
addressed two issues: whether a lawyer's failure to identify a legal argument as an extension of existing law rather than application of existing law was sanctionable, and whether
a lawyer's failure to cite contrary authority in violation of the American Bar Association's ethical rules was sanctionable. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1141. The court dealt with
legal arguments not allegations or claims. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1141. The en bane
court in Townsend emphasized that the passage in Golden Eagle which stated the district court could not impose sanctions because "a particular argument or ground for relief contained in a non-frivolous motion is found to be unjustified" referred solely to
legal arguments in support of claims. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1140-41.
6. See Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 881 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989) (Townsend I).
7. Townsend, 914 F. 2d at 1139.
8. Townsend I, 881 F.2d at 788.
9. Id. at 791.
lO. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1138.
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improperly obstructed the unsuccessful state court action."ll
Wilson moved to dismiss the complaint and requested sanctions. 12 He included affidavits, from the President of the Plan
and from another attorney who represented the Plan, stating
that the firm had been involved with the Plan only during the
state litigation process and did not participate in the adoption,
implementation, or administration of the Plan. iS Wright did not
rebut the affidavits. l' In an amended complaint, Wright dropped
the allegation that Wilson had given advice regarding the adoption of Plan provisions, but continued to name the firm as a defendant involved in conduct which injured his client. 1D Wilson
again moved to dismiss the amended complaint and again requested sanctions. 16
The district court dismissed the complaint and permitted
Townsend to file a second amended complaint against all defendants except Wilson. 17 The court also imposed a Rule 11
sanction against Wright finding that Wright had sued "without
a reasonable investigation, without adequate basis in law or fact,
and for the purposes of harassment. "18
Wright filed a notice of appeal of the sanction order/ 9 then
moved for reconsideration of the sanction or in the alternative
for a stay pending appeal. 20 The district court denied the motion
and imposed an additional $500 sanction.21 The court determined that the motion for reconsideration was frivolous, because
the filing of a notice of appeal divested the district court of jurisdiction. 22 The motion for a stay pending appeal was also de11. Id. at 1139.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1139.
15. Id.

16. Townsend I, 881 F.2d at 791.
17. Id. The claims against Wilson & Reitman were dismissed with prejudice. Id. The
Townsend's did submit a second amended complaint. The district court dismissed all of
the Townsend's claims with prejudice. Id.
18. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1139. The district court imposed a Rule 11 sanction in
the amount of $3,000 finding that the conduct of the Townsend's attorney was "plainly
nothing short of outrageous." Townsend I, 881 F.2d at 791.
19. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1139.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1139. The district court stated that the filing of a post-
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termined to be frivolous because it did not comply with FED. R.
CIV. P. 62.28 Wright appealed the order for further sanction. 24
The appeals of both sanctions were consolidated.2lI
Originally, a three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit reversed both sanction orders in Townsend I finding that neither
appeal could be sanctioned as frivolous, because neither was
frivolous as a whole. 26 The Ninth Circuit took the case en banc
to reconsider Rule 11 sanctions for partially frivolous
pleadings. 27
III.
A.

COURT'S ANALYSIS
BACKGROUND

Rule 11 provides that a paper, certified by an attorney,
must be sanctioned if the paper is filed for an improper purpose
or is frivolous, both baseless and made without reasonable and
competent inquiry.28 Improper purpose and frivolousness are independent grounds. 29 Either ground is sufficient to sustain a
sanction. 30 An objective standard is used to review both grounds,
the "reasonableness under the circumstances" standard. S ! A speappeal motion was against "obvious and well known principle[sl of law." Townsend I,
881 F.2d at 791.
23. Id. FED. R. CIV. P. 62 (c) requires the appellant to give a supersedeas bond at or
after the time of filing of the notice of appeal in order to obtain a stay. The stay is
effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by the court.
24. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1139.
25. Id.
26. Townsend I, 881 F.2d at 794. The first amended complaint had named nonfrivolous defendants, and the motion for reconsideration was not frivolous in aski~g for a
stay pending appeal. Id. at 795, 797.
27. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1139.
28. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1990) The
two clauses of Rule 11: "well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law" and "improper purpose" clauses are linked by the conjunction "and". Because both clauses are
certified to by the attorney when signing, the rule suggests each clause is to be viewed
independently. Id. (quoting Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir.
1986) (filing of federal court action claiming that recall petition violated Voting Rights
Act was good faith argument that was grounded in fact and not interposed for any improper purpose).
29. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1140. See Zaldiuar, 780 F.2d at 832. The court in Townsend emphasized that while separate and distinct inquiries, the two grounds often overlap. Evidence regarding frivolousness is often highly indicative of improper purpose.
Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1140.
30. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1140.
31. Id. (citing Zaldiuar, 780 F.2d at 829). The 1983 Amendments to Rule 11 changed
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cial rule applies when the court considers complaints which initiate actions. S2 In order to determine that a complaint is filed for
an improper purpose a court must first find that it was
frivolous. 33
In Townsend, the district court had imposed sanctions on
the first amended complaint on both frivolousness and improper
purpose grounds. s4 For this reason, and because a finding of improper purpose must be supported by a finding of frivolousness
for a complaint, the Ninth Circuit considered the frivolousness
issue. 36
1.

Frivolousness

The Ninth Circuit found that a previous panel of the Ninth
Circuit, in Murphy v. Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc.,36 had
misinterpreted a passage in Golden Eagle Distribution Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp.37 that discussed Rule 11 to include frivolous allegations. 38 The passage read:
Nothing in the language of the Rule or the Advithe standard against which an alleged violation is to be tested. Prior to 1983, Rule 11
required subjective bad faith by the signing attorney. The new standard tests the knowledge of the attorney by a reasonableness under the circumstances standard. While the
former standard required the signing attorney to make a willful violation of the rule, the
new standard does not require the violation to be willful. "There is no room for a pure
heart, empty head defense under Rule 11." Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 829 (quoting
Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule II-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181,
187 (1985)).
32. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1140.
33. [d. (citing Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 832), in which it was found that a defendant
cannot be harassed under Rule 11 if the plaintiff files a complaint which is "well .
grounded in fact and warranted by existing law." The court in To'wnsend noted that
greater protection must be given to the complaint which is the means by which a plaintiff seeks to obtain substantive legal rights. The court noted that enforcement of the
private plaintiff's substantive legal rights may often benefit the public in advancing public policies, even if the motive for asserting the claim is not entirely pure. Townsend, 914
F.2d at 1140.
34. [d. The district court stated, "[p)laintiff did not make the 'reasonable inquiry'
required by Rule 11 and it is found that suing the lawyers was not in good faith and for
the purposes of harassment." Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1140. The Ninth Circuit noted that
the district court's finding of no reasonable inquiry was equivalent to a finding of frivolousness, baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry. ld.
35. [d.
36. 854 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1988).
37. 801 F.2d 1531, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1986).
38. Murphy, 854 F.2d at 1205.
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sory Committee Notes supports the view that the
Rule empowers the district court to impose sanctions on lawyers simply because a particular argument or ground for relief contained in a non-frivolous motion is found by the district court to be
unjustified. 89
The court in Townsend stated that the phrase "ground for relief' referred to legal arguments in support of claims, not allegations or claims. 40 In Murphy, the Ninth Circuit, without any discussion, simply substituted the word "allegations" for the term
"ground for relief."41 The holding in Murphy was subsequently
followed in Community Electric Services of Los Angeles, Inc. v.
National Electrical Contractors Association,42 among other succeeding cases. 4S The court stated that under the logic of Murphy
and Community Electric, the earlier Ninth Circuit panel decision in Townsend was understandable."
However, citing Cooter & Cell v. Hartmarx Corp.;'r, the en
banc court determined that the central purpose of Rule 11 was
to deter baseless filings. 46 Because the holding in Murphy would
allow a party with one non-frivolous claim to add frivolous allegations without the fear of sanctions, the en banc court ex39. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1140.
40. [d. at 1141.
41. [d. at 1205. The court stated, "Rule 11 permits sanctions only when the pleading
as a whole is frivolous or of a harassing nature, not when one of the allegations or arguments in a pleading may be so characterized." [d.
42. 869 F.2d 1235, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 236 (1990) (Rule
11 permits sanctions only where pleading as a whole is frivolous).
43. See Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1429 (9th Cir. 1989) (that some
allegations made at the onset of litigation later prove to be unfounded does not make a
complaint frivolous if the complaint also contains some un-frivolous claims).
44. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1141. Community Electric, 869 F. 2d at 1242, stated that
the language of Rule 11 requires the court to evaluate the pleading or paper filed as a
whole (quoting Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831, emphasizing that Rule 11 sanctions are assessed if the paper is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation).
45. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990) (District Court can impose Rule 11 sanctions after plaintiff voluntarily dismissed action. Policy goals of Rule 11 include deterrence and streamlining of the judicial process).
46. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1141. The court quoted a passage in Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmax Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990) which stated: "It is now clear that the central
purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in District Court, and thus, consistent with
the Rule Enabling Act's grant of authority, streamline the administration and procedure
of the federal courts." Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1141 (quoting Cooter & Cell, 110 S. Ct. at
2454).
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pressly overruled Murphy.·7 The primary rational was to prevent parties with one non-frivolous claim from adding frivolous
allegations without fear of sanctions. 48
In response to concerns that Rule 11 sanctions would
"spawn satellite litigation and chill vigorous advocacy,"49 the
court found that the best answer was not to construct an "artificial 'safe harbor' for frivolous allegations or claims" which would
favor form over substance:!O The Ninth Circuit stated that in
determining whether a claim was frivolous, the courts should determine if the attorney's inquiry was reasonable under "all the
circumstances of the case. "lB.
The court offered several examples of when a determination
of a "reasonable inquiry under all the circumstances of the case"
may permit a more limited and cursory inquiry. 52 A determination of what is reasonable inquiry under the circumstances of
the case may differ depending on the amount of time available
and the complexity of the case. 53 If a lawyer discovers a potential cause of action with only a short period of time before the
statute of limitations expire, a more limited inquiry will be tolerated than when there is ample time to investigate before filing a
complaint. 54 If relevant facts are under the control of the opposing party, or if the case is complex and initially requires the
47. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1141.
48. Id. The court stated, "[iJt would ill serve the purpose of deterrence to allow, as

does Murphy, a safe harbor for improper or unwarranted allegations." Id.
49. Id. (quoting Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990)). The Supreme Court in
Cooter & Gell stated, "[aJthough the rule must be read in light of concerns that it will
spawn satellite litigation and chill vigorous advocacy, any interpretation must give effect
to the rule's central goal of deterrence." Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2454. The Ninth
Circuit offered an example of the chilling of advocacy as attorneys, because of the fear of
sanctions, refusing cases where courts must recognize new rights. Townsend, 914 F.2d at
1141.
50. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1142. The Ninth Circuit stated that such a safe-harbor
rule would encourage pleading parties to manipulate the form in which claims were
presented, allowing combination of frivolous and non-frivolous claims. Id.
51. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated, "[tJhe answer lies in recognizing, as did the Supreme Court in Cooter & Gell, that Rule l1's requirement of a 'reasonable inquiry'
means an inquiry reasonable under 'all the circumstances of the case.' " Townsend, 914
F.2d at 1142 (quoting Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2459).
52. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1142 (citing examples from the Supreme Court analysis
of "reasonable inquiry under all the circumstances of the case" in Cooter & Gell, 110 S.
Ct. at 2459).
53. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1142.
54. Id.
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naming of numerous defendants, such as a complex product liability case, more leeway may be given to imprecision at the onset
of litigation. 11I1
The court cited the Second Circuit's opinion in Oliveri v.
Thompson,1I6 as a "straight forward, common sense application
of the 'reasonable inquiry.' "117 Oliveri denoted factors for assessment including knowledge that reasonably could have been acquired at the time the pleading was filed, the type of claim and
the difficulty of acquiring sufficient information, which party
had access to relevant facts, and "the significance of the claim in
the pleading as a whole."lIs Unlike Murphy, the Ninth Circuit in
Townsend found that the mere existence of a non-frivolous
claim is not dispositive. 1I9
The court acknowledged that while Murphy created a
"bright line" which would decrease satellite litigation, the Rule's
requirement of a "reasonable inquiry" demands a fact-based inquiry for which "bright lines" are not appropriate. 60
2. Legal Distinction Between Improper Purpose in Part and
Frivolousness In Part
The en bane court in Townsend noted that with the overruling of Murphy, there was no need for the previous legal distinction, made by the earlier panel majority,61 which allowed a
55. Id.
56. 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986) (analysis of a district courts award of sanctions
against a civil rights attorney for allegedly instituting and continuing prosecution of meritless and frivolous claims).
57. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1142.
58. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1142 (quoting Cross & Cross Properties v. SOS Everett
Allied Co., 886 F.2d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Oliveri».
59. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1142.
60. Id. at 1142-43.
61. Townsend, 881 F.2d at 795. The Ninth Circuit, in a majority panel, noted that
the pleading-as-a-whole rule did not apply to "improper purpose" cases. The panel emphasized the difference in the analyses between frivolousness and improper purpose. The
court stated that "[i]t is illogical, and counter to Golden Eagle, to hold a pleading, examined as a whole, frivolous if it states a colorable claim for relief. By contrast, there is
no logical difficulty with a finding that the inclusion in a pleading of an unconscionable
damages claim (or any other claim), for the purpose of harassing the opposing party,
renders the pleading unsanctionable under Rule 11. 'Rule 11 permits sanctions [for frivolousness] only where the pleading as a whole is frivolous . . . . An entire pleading has a
harassing or improper purpose if the litigant included one of the claims or allegations
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pleading or paper harassing-in-part to be sanctioned but not one
that was only frivolous-in-part. 62 The court stated that as the
inquiries into frivolousness and improper purpose frequently
overlap, a district court may infer that the pleading is filed for
an improper purpose if there is solid evidence of a pleading's
frivolousness. 63 The court stated that the inference was permissible because the test for improper purpose is objective. 64

B.

ApPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES TO THE CASE

1.

The First Amended Complaint

The Ninth Circuit held that the sanction of the first
amended complaint was justified and not an abuse of discretion. 611 The court did not address the issue of whether sufficient
information existed to name the law partnership of Wilson &
Reitman in the initial complaint. 66 Instead, the court addressed
the facts found by the district court after the filing of the complaint. The court noted that Wright did not rebut the affidavits
provided by Wilson in a motion to dismiss. 67 Rather, in response, Wright filed a first amended complaint that re-alleged
the firm's involvement. 6s The district court determined that
with that purpose'. " (quoting Community Electric, 869 F.2d at 1242-43).
62. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1143. The court emphasized that the holding in Community Electric, (a pleading or paper that was harassing in part could be sanctioned) was
made to reconcile the Murphy reading of Golden Eagle (pleading-as-a-whole rule includes allegations and claims) with the decision in Hudson v. Moore Business Forms,
Inc., 836 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1987), which held that although a defendant's counterclaim was non-frivolous, the four million dollar claim for damages, in the same pleading; was frivolous. The Ninth Circuit, in Hudson, agreed with the district court that
there was a strong inference from the nature and lack of justification for the defendant's
damage claim that the claim was filed for an improper purpose. Hudson was therefore
distinguished, in Community Electric, as an improper purpose case. Townsend, 914 F.2d
at 1143.
63. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1143. The court stated, "[al district court confronted
with solid evidence of a pleading's frivolousness may in circumstances that warrant it
infer that it was filed for an improper purpose." Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1143.
66. Id. The court noted in footnote 5, that the sanctioning of claims in initial complaints are more likely to be an abuse of discretion. The court firmly stated that Rule 11
sanctions are not meant to take precedence over the Federal Rules' generous discovery
provisions. Id.
67. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1144.
68. Id. The Ninth Circuit majority panel noted that although the first amended
complaint no longer alleged that the defendants had any role in the adoption of the
Plan, the complaint still named Wilson & Reitman as defendants. Townsend, 881 F.2d at
791.
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Wright conducted "absolutely no inquiry" before filing
amended complaint. 69 The en banc court determined
lack of inquiry and the baselessness of the allegations
the district court's finding of frivolousness as a ground
11 sanction. 70

the first
that the
justified
for Rule

The Ninth Circuit also held the district court's finding of
improper purpose to be justified and not an abuse of discretion. 71 The en banc court determined, from the district court
record, that the district court inferred from the facts72 that the
naming of Wilson as a defendant in the federal court action was
"essentially vindictive."73 The Ninth Circuit again noted that
the test for improper purpose was objective, and determined
that it was not an abuse of discretion to find that Wright's behavior manifested an improper purpose under a reasonableness
standard. 74
2.

The Motion for Reconsideration

The Ninth Circuit held that the district court was justified
in finding that the motion to vacate and reconsider was frivolous, and no abuse of discretion had occurred.7~ The district
court had determined that the attorney should have known that
filing of an appeal would divest the district court of jurisdiction. 76 The Ninth Circuit agreed, stating that a "competent
69. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1144.
70. Id.
71. Id. The district court stated, "[nlot only does plaintiff not state a cause of action
against the plan's lawyers, or submit any facts in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, the act of suing the opponent's lawyers in this situation is plainly nothing
short of ou trag eo us ... I d.
72. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1144. The Ninth Circuit cited two facts: the fact that the
allegations were frivolous and the fact that Wilson & Reitman had been the law firm
which opposed Wright in the state court action. Id.
73. Id. The court emphasized that in order to defer to the fact-finding power of the
district courts, the district courts need to give thorough explanations of the reasons for
sanctions. In this case because Wright conducted absolutely no inquiry, the district
court's brief statement of findings and reasoning was adequate. Id.
74. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1144.
75. [d. at 1145.
76. Id. The district court stated, "[als should have been apparent to plaintiff's counsel, the taking of an appeal divested this court of jurisdiction to consider any modification of its previous sanction order, even if it was convinced that it should modify the
order. This is an obvious and well-known principle of law which should have been known
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reading of our rule and precedents would have quickly made
clear to Wright that he did not follow the correct procedures."77
However, the en banc court found legally incorrect the district court's rationale for finding the motion for a stay frivolous 78
and the district court's holding an abuse of discretion. 79 The en
banc court noted that in International Telemeter v. Hamlin International CO.,80 the Ninth Ciruit had held that a district court
may, at its discretion, permit other securities than a bond. 81 The
court stated that the fact that Wright did not cite International
Telemeter did not make the motion subject to sanction. 82 The
court held that the motion was warranted under existing law. 83
3.

Concurring Opinion

Judge Canby, joined by Judge Pregerson, concurred with
the result reached by the majority regarding the first amended
complaint. 84 However, Judge Canby emphasized that sanctions
should be imposed only when all of the allegations against a particular defendant are frivolous. 85 Differing from the majority, he
maintained that the previous Ninth Circuit cases had been properly decided. 86 While agreeing that Golden Eagle dealt only with
legal arguments, Judge Canby emphasized that other portions of
to plaintiff and obviated the necessity of defendant's expenditure in defending the motion." Id. at 1144.
77. [d. at 1145.
78. [d.
79. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1145. The district court stated that the attorney did not
correctly follow the procedure of FED. R. CIV. P. 62, in posting a supersedeas bond. "[A)
simple reading of Rule 62 should have answered plaintiff's inquiry about a stay. Accordingly, plaintiff's counsel could not have made the 'reasonable inquiry it [the motion) ...
is warranted by existing law .. .' since there is no semblance of existing law which would
have justified the motion." Id.
80. 754 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1985) (although federal rule provides that a supersedeas
bond may be used to stay execution of judgment pending appeal, the court has discretion
to allow alternate forms of judgment guarantee).
81. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1145 (citing International Telemeter, 754 F.2d at 1495).
82. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1145 (citing Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1541-42) (reversal
of a district court sanction given because the attorney failed to cite contrary authority).
83. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1145. Because the district court erroneously believed
there were two grounds for the sanction of the motion, the en banc court remanded the
case for consideration of the amount of the award. Id.
84.Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1146.
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that opinion were concerned' with the effect of "over-exacting interpretations of Rule 11" which could chill vIgorous advocacy
and create extensive satellite litigation. 87
Judge Canby stated that Murphy and Community Electric
were appropriate decisions according to the language of Rule
11. 88 He emphasized that the language of Rule 11 provides that
the attorney or party signing the pleading, motion, or paper certifies that "it" is well grounded in fact and law. 89 Judge Canby
asserted that the use of the word "it" refers to the pleading, or
paper filed as a whole. 90
Judge Canby expressed concern that the majority's approach of permitting sanctions for partially frivolous pleadings
could lead to serious abuse. 91 He noted that the flexible rule
could result in after-the-fact scrutiny of pleadings for isolated
deficiencies. 92 Judge Canby asserted that the lack of a bright line
rule would lead to varying standards and greatly increased satellite litigation over sanctions. 93
Judge Canby stated that he would not overrule Murphy,
but would slightly modify the bright line rule, and impose sanctions only when all claims against any particular defendant were
frivolous. 94 He stated that this modification would protect defendants against frivolous lawsuits, establish an easily administered boundary, and allow vigorous advocacy.91i
87. Id. (citing Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1540 n.4, 1541) (expressing concern regarding possible misrepresentation of aggressive and justified representation of the client and
the expenses of satellite litigation).
88. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1146.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Community Electric, 869 F.2d at 1242) (language of Rule 11 requires the court to evaluate the pleading or paper as a whole). The majority disagreed
with Judge Canby'S belief that the plain language of Rule 11 favors the Murphy pleading-as-a-whole rule. The majority stated that the Rule 11 language did not imply that a
pleading is well-grounded simply because one part of the pleading is well grounded. The
majority felt that the language simply implied that a minor or insignificant allegation or
subclaim should not be sanctioned. The majority noted that under Judge Canby's proposed disposition of the case, the court would have to ignore significant parts of a pleading in determining if sanctions are appropriate. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1143 n.4.
91. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1146.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1146-47.
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CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit in Townsend addressed whether an attorney may be sanctioned for a complaint which is only partially
frivolous. In deciding that pleadings, motions, or papers may be
sanctioned even if only frivolous in part, the court overruled
Murphy u. Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc. As a consequence,
the court overruled completely the pleading-as-a-whole rule for
a complaint, or for any other paper. Papers may now be sanctioned if frivolous-in-part or filed for an improper purpose in
part. In taking this step, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
greatly increased the scope of papers which may be sanctioned.
Donna H. Mullen*
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